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I. INTRODUCTION
The targeting of persons engages the most fundamental of all the
norms in the law of war: the principle of distinction. Indeed, scholar
Gary Solis calls it the “most significant battlefield concept a combatant
must observe.”1 The rule itself is simple and direct: in its study of
customary international humanitarian law, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains, “The parties to the
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants.
Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”2 Unlike some
provisions of the law of war, the principle of distinction applies to
both international armed conflicts, that is, traditional conflicts
between nation-states, as well as non-international armed conflicts
(NIACs) involving nonstate actors who are part of armed groups.3

* Major General, USAF (Ret.), Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and
National Security, Duke Law School. This essay is a version of remarks made by the
author at the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conference on the Law of Armed Conflict in
April of 2017, but is expanded and updated with new material.
1.
GARY D. SOLIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 269 (2d ed. 2016).
2.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between
Civilians
and
Combatants,
CUSTOMARY
IHL
DATABASE,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (last visited Feb. 21,
2018) [https://perma.cc/B49V-YKTG] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
3.
The law applicable to non-international armed conflicts is essentially
premised on “Common Article 3” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Geneva Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287. The ICRC explains non-international armed conflicts as follows:
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The Manual on Non-International Armed Conflicts, for example,
insists that a “distinction must always be made in the conduct of
military operations between fighters and civilians.”4
In the twenty-first century, the challenge for Israel, the United
States, and other rule-of-law nations relates to the latter type of
conflict, that is, the targeting of persons in NAICs. Very often, the
nonstate beings confronted by nation-states in NIACs do not wear
uniforms and embed themselves among civilians for the explicit
purpose of blurring the distinction between targetable belligerents and
protected civilians. That blurring can operate to deter attacks by
cautious and conscientious militaries. Moreover, if attacks are
conducted, the nonstate actors often use the occurrence of any
incidental civilian casualties to claim a violation of the law of war and
in that way undermine the legitimacy of the nation-state’s military
operations. As Professor William Eckhart observes:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance
with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal and immoral
and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our vulnerability
here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our ‘center of
gravity.’5

Exploiting respect for the rule of law is increasingly the primary
way adversaries facing opponents like the United States, Israel, and
other nations equipped with advanced weaponry will seek to offset that
technological advantage. Indeed, many of these adversaries are quite
willing to orchestrate civilian casualty events.
For example, during the 2017 offensive against the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), ISIL fighters drew an attack on a

Common Article 3 [of the General Conventions] applies to "armed conflicts not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties". These include armed conflicts in which one or more nongovernmental armed groups are involved. Depending on the situation, hostilities
may occur between governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed
groups or between such groups only. As the four Geneva Conventions have
universally been ratified now, the requirement that the armed conflict must
occur "in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" has lost its
importance in practice. Indeed, any armed conflict between governmental armed
forces and armed groups or between such groups cannot but take place on the
territory of one of the Parties to the Convention.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International
Humanitarian Law?, at 3 (Mar. 2008).
4.
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 10
(2006).
5.
William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His
Sword, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 431, 441 (2003).
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building in Mosul, Iraq.6 Unbeknownst to coalition forces, ISIL had
hidden explosives in the building, and the coalition strike triggered
them, killing over one hundred civilians, with initial reports blaming
the coalition for their deaths.7 The ultimate purpose of such adversary
strategies is to undermine public support, both domestically and
internationally, and in that way derail the military effort.
Make no mistake about it: democracies need public support to
wage war. As two Yale scholars wrote in 1994: “In modern popular
democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base
of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly,
no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the
war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.”8
This writer has called the strategy of attempting to erode public
support through weaponized allegations of illegality “lawfare.”9 The
purpose of this brief essay is to discuss several specific contemporary
issues of targeting of persons in the context of current operations and
to propose some ways for countering adversary efforts.
II. HUMAN SHIELDS
As already indicated, adversaries today are not just
opportunistically exploiting situations where civilians are incidentally
killed in an attack; they are actively seeking to cause civilian casualties
or, equally as nefariously effective, to create the fear of causing them
in the leadership of law-abiding militaries and the societies they
represent. The end result is the same: an attack is either limited or
forgone altogether. One of the means adversaries employ to create the
desired effect is the extensive use of human shielding.
Human shielding, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) tells us, is the “intentional co-location of military objectives and
civilians or persons hors de combat with the specific intent of trying to
prevent the targeting of those military objectives.”10 While human
shielding is not new to warfare, the extent to which the tactic has today
been regularized and systematically employed is unparalleled in the

6.
Bill Chappell, Pentagon Blames 105 Civilian Deaths From Mosul Strike On
'Secondary
Explosion',
NPR
(May
25,
2017,
7:43
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/25/528925544/report-on-u-s-airstrikethat-killed-civilians-in-mosul-to-be-released-thursday
[https://perma.cc/CL88-QA4R]
(archived Feb. 5, 2018).
7.
Id.
8.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR, at xxiv
(1994).
9.
See generally Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare 101: A Primer,
97 MIL. REV. 8, 9 (2017).
10.
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 340 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005).
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modern era. For example, during the fight for Mosul in 2017, the ISIL’s
use of human shielding was so “rampant” as to be considered
“unprecedented”—even in a conflict where almost no atrocity has been
left unused.11
Conventional law of war thinking universally condemns the use of
human shields but still insists that attackers must consider the human
shields as “civilians” in the targeting calculation. That calculation is
found textually in various law of war treaties but is also considered
customary international law. The ICRC defines the rule as:
“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”12
The problem is that in contemporary conflicts the rule too often
incentivizes unscrupulous fighters. Specifically, if such fighters
surround themselves with enough civilians, they can legally “shield”
themselves by manufacturing a targeting calculation where the
expected incidental loss of civilian life would be unlawfully “excessive.”
This is because many authorities deem the resulting civilian deaths to
still be the responsibility of the attacker, even when the defender acts
illegally by employing human shields. Put another way, the defender
creates a real benefit for himself by violating the law of war
proscription against the use of human shields.
The international community—to include the legal community—
has proven to be impotent against nonstate actors who flaunt the law
of war in their use of human shielding. Indeed, Israel has found Hamas
doctrinal and training manuals “attest to Hamas’s intentional efforts
to draw the IDF into combat in densely populated areas and to actively
use the civilian population in order to obstruct the IDF’s military
operations.”13 That an adversary would be bold enough to actually
train to violate the law is a testament to how serious the situation has
become.
The United States attempted to address this situation by
announcing in its 2015 Law of War Manual that harm to human

11.
Hollie McKay & Steven Nabil, How ISIS uses human shields in fighting
coalition forces, FOX NEWS (July 11, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/
2017/07/11/how-isis-uses-human-shields-in-fighting-coalition-forces.html
[https://perma.cc/K2YP-7ZYX] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
12.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, CUSTOMARY
IHL DATABASE, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_
rule14 (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y762-26WA] (archived Feb. 21,
2018).
13.
ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL
AND LEGAL ASPECTS 152 (May 2015), http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/
2014GazaConflictFullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/322F-PNJ3] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
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shields does “not prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule.”14
However, a subsequent revision eliminated that provision and instead
attempted to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary human
shields by saying that “the commander may determine that persons
characterized as voluntary human shields are taking a direct part in
hostilities.”15 As this writer has said elsewhere:
This statement seems to be half-right. Whether or not a civilian—human shield
or otherwise—needs to be considered in the proportionality analysis in
determining whether or not their loss is anticipated to be “excessive” in a
particular situation does not turn on their voluntary/involuntary mental state,
but rather whether or not their actions constitute “taking part” in hostilities. If
by their behavior they take a direct part in hostilities, they lose their protection
from attack, and need not be considered in the proportionality analysis. It is hard
to think of what action could be more directly participating in hostilities than
attempting to shield a bona fide military objective from an otherwise legitimate
attack.16

What about the involuntary human shields? As one scholar has
observed, it is difficult to conceptually differentiate between
involuntary human shields who are, it is argued by most law of war
specialists, fully protected, and involuntary conscripts who are
typically targetable at any time.17 As a practical matter, it is unclear
how combatants in the midst of the chaos of modern conflict are
supposed to determine the mental state of actors whose behavior would
constitute taking a direct part in hostilities.
Regardless, the use of human shields has been unwittingly
encouraged by the public statements of officials from rule-of-law
countries. For example, in 2008 a NATO spokesman announced that
“[i]f there is the likelihood of even one civilian casualty, we will not
strike, not even if we think Osama bin Laden is down there.”18
Similarly, the Obama administration publically announced that
certain military operations would not take place absent a “near

14.
See Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., No Good Options Against ISIS
Barbarism? Human Shields in 21st Century Conflicts, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 311,
312 (2016) [hereinafter ISIS Barbarism].
15.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 5.12.3–5.12.4 (2016)
[hereinafter DOD MANUAL].
16.
ISIS Barbarism, supra note 14, at 313.
17.
Id. (citing Michael Gross, The Ethics of Using Human Shields in War,
ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/
2014/the-paradox-of-using-human-shields-in-war/
[https://perma.cc/4S4C-9YCK]
(archived Feb. 5, 2018)).
18.
Pamela Constable, NATO Hopes to Undercut Taliban With 'Surge' of
Projects, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/26/AR2008092603452.html [https://perma.cc/26Q3-6ZPU]
(archived Feb. 5, 2018) (quoting NATO spokesman Brigadier General Richard
Blanchette).
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certainty” that no civilians would be put at risk—a standard no
interpretation of international law would mandate.19
It appears that these public pronouncements were intended to
garner support from the indigenous population as well as the citizenry
of the troop-contributing countries. For example, the Obama
administration contended that the “sustainability and legitimacy of
these operations are best served through the clear and public
articulation of the legal and policy frameworks under which such
operations are conducted.”20
However, there is utterly no data to suggest that the effort
succeeded or even made any difference in public opinion about the
justice or, for that matter, injustice of the cause. What is rather obvious
is that it provided the unprincipled adversary with a road map to an
operational benefit: if you want to protect yourself from air attack, keep
at least one civilian close by. This perverse inducement which puts
civilians at risk is completely at odds with the fundamental purpose of
the law of war to protect civilians.21
In addition, it can create difficulties in operations where, for
example, the terrain—such as the urban environment often faced by
Israelis—along with enemy tactics that place civilians deliberately at
risk virtually assures civilian casualties will occur.22 Unfortunatley,
the public can become conditioned to a mindset that mistakenly
concludes if any civilian casualties occur, something must have went
wrong, if not deliberate war crime.
III. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
One of the most vexing aspects of an adversary’s use of lawfare
vis-à-vis the targeting of persons is the all too frequently misleading or
outright inaccurate coverage by the media of civilian casualty
incidents. Examples abound, even in the media considered the most

19.
Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Presidential Memorandum—“Legal
and Policy Transparency Concerning United States’ Use of Military Force and Related
National Security Operations” and Accompanying Report on Transparency in Legal and
Policy
Frameworks,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(Dec.
5,
2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/05/fact-sheetpresidential-memorandum-legal-and-policy-transparency
[https://perma.cc/Y78XHP4L] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
20.
Id.
21.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2007), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amidwarfare/ [https://perma.cc/B5XP-85Q4] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
22.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Sadly, we have to expect more civilian
casualties if ISIS is to be defeated, DUKE UNIV. LAWFIRE (Mar. 26, 2017),
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/03/26/sadly-we-have-to-expect-more-civiliancasualties-if-isis-is-to-be-defeated/ [https://perma.cc/BTG4-XKSF] (archived Mar. 20,
2018).
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sophisticated. The New York Times recently discussed the law and did
so erroneously. Specifically, they summarized the law of targeting in
this way: “International law governing war or self-defense allows
countries to knowingly kill some civilians as an incidental consequence
of attacking a legitimate military target, so long as the bystander
deaths are deemed necessary and proportionate.”23
This writer contends:
In other words the rule is not, as the Times would have it, that the law “allows
countries to knowingly kill some civilians.” “Some” is obviously not a synonym
for “excessive,” and I would argue that in this context, it suggests it always must
be a small number, an interpretation which would indicate that the law is much
less realistic than it really is.24

Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg explains further:
International humanitarian law lacks a definition of the term ‘excessive’. There
is, however, general agreement that ‘excessive’ is not synonymous with
‘extensive’ and that assessing excessiveness ‘is not a matter of counting civilian
casualties and comparing them to the number of enemy combatants that have
been put out of action’. It has been rightly held that ‘even extensive civilian
casualties need not be excessive in light of the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated’.25

In short, the Times’ summary of the law is plainly misleading,
and—if
accepted
by
the
public—could
create
serious
misunderstandings of the law of war as it applies to targeting
decisions.
Another common distortion is the frequent reference in the press
about “innocent” civilians being victimized in an otherwise legitimate
attack on nonstate fighters in a NIAC.26 Actually, it would be
extraordinarily unusual if any media source would have enough
information to determine if particular civilians were legally or morally
“innocent.” In many instances civilians proximate to a bona fide target

23.
Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone
Strikes
and
Commando
Raids,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raidsrules.html [https://perma.cc/26NT-5MF7] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
24.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., How the New York Times
misconstrues the law on civilian casualties, DUKE UNIV. LAWFIRE (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/10/13/how-the-new-york-times-misconstrues-thelaw-on-civilian-casualties/ [https://perma.cc/G66P-D54G] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
25.
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Proportionality and Collateral Damage, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2166
(last
updated
Oct.
2015)
[https://perma.cc/AN6D-HJ9Y] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
26.
See, e.g., Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Civilian Casualties, Drones,
Airstrikes and the Perils of Policy, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 11, 2015),
https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/civilian-casualties-drones-airstrikes-and-the-perilsof-policy/ [https://perma.cc/AZ27-V74L] (archived Feb. 5, 2018) (discussing how civilians
included in the death tolls are sometimes supporting the terriorist group).
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may be legally and morally culpable for serious crimes. In the United
States, for example, the provision of material support to certain
terrorists is a serious felony.27
None of this is to suggest that civilians, even criminal civilians,
are—or should be—necessarily targetable persons under the law of war
or that the law of war targeting calculation should be altered. Rather,
it is to point out that precision in the reporting matters and that when
the adjective of “innocent” is indiscriminately used it may create an
undeserved level of emotionalism in the public’s perception about how
the conflict is being fought.
Exactly why journalists report the way they do is beyond the scope
of this Article, but a recent study by Harvard’s Shorenstein Center
about media coverage of President Trump has insights beyond that
context:
Although journalists are accused of having a liberal bias, their real bias is a
preference for the negative. News reporting turned sour during the Vietnam and
Watergate era and has stayed that way. Journalists’ incentives, everything from
getting their stories on the air to acquiring a reputation as a hard-hitting
reporter, encourage journalists to focus on what’s wrong . . . rather than what’s
right.28

Similarly, New York Times opinion columnist Ross Douhet sought
to explain why “nobody seemed to notice” the recent defeat of ISIL in
Iraq and Syria.29 With remarkable candor he admitted that: “this is
also a press failure, a case where the media is not adequately reporting
an important success because it does not fit into the narrative of
Trumpian disaster in which our journalistic entities are all invested.”
Irrespective of what one may think of President Trump, the fact is that
politics invades reportage, especially concerning issues associated with
targeting in armed conflict.
All of this may explain to a degree a particularly egregious story
about civilian casualties published by the New York Times Magazine.30
Entitled The Uncounted, writers Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal claim
to have visited 150 of what they said were sites of US and coalition air
attacks. From those visits they say they concluded “the air war has

27.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 2 (2010) (upholding the statute outlawing providing material support to a
foreign terrorist organization).
28.
THOMAS E. PATTERSON, HARV. UNIV. SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POL.,
AND PUB. POL’Y, NEWS COVERAGE OF DONALD TRUMP’S FIRST 100 DAYS 8 (2017).
29.
Ross Douthat, A War Trump Won, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/war-trump-islamic-state.html
[https://perma.cc/NFS2-6KE6] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
30.
Azmat Khan & Anand Gopal, The Uncounted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civiliancasualties-iraq-airstrikes.html?_r=3 [https://perma.cc/A2G2-RWR9] (archived Feb. 5,
2018).
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been significantly less
Additionally, they said:

precise

than

the

coalition

claims.”31

[T]hat one in five of the coalition strikes [they] identified resulted in civilian
death, a rate more than 31 times that acknowledged by the coalition. It is at such
a distance from official claims that, in terms of civilian deaths, this may be the
least transparent war in recent American history.32

The problem? The authors, who were not New York Times
reporters but rather held positions in a nongovernmental organization,
had no discernable expertise in casualty or bomb damage assessments.
More importantly, U.S. Central Command said in its “Monthly Civilian
Casualty Report” (November 30, 2017) that the Coalition had
“conducted a total of 28,198 strikes that included 56,976 separate
engagements between August 2014 and October 2017.”33
Consequently, this writer contended:
Yes, that’s right, from a sample size of just 150, Khan and Gopal extrapolated to
an entire air war that thus far has involved almost 57,000 separate
engagements. Even if you believe their claims, at best they examined only .003%
of the engagements. Again, even if you believe their data, was it really fair to
suggest from their tiny sample that the entire “air war” was “significantly less
precise” as they claimed? That the campaign lacked transparency? Isn’t it vastly
more likely that their data set was so minuscule that they could not legitimately
opine about the whole “air war” as they did?34

Yet despite the many questions about the legitimacy of the article,
shortly after its publication, Marc Garlosco, a self-described UN war
crimes investigator proclaimed as a “shocking truth” that “U.S.
airstrikes there are killing far more civilians than the U.S.
acknowledges” and that “we know the system is broken.”35 What is
actually a “shocking truth” is that a UN war crimes investigator would
accept to blithely allegations that are so suspect.

31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, Combined Joint Task Force—
Operation Inherent Resolve Monthly Civilian Casualty Report (Nov. 30, 2017),
http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/
1383637/combined-joint-task-force-operation-inherent-resolve-monthly-civiliancasualty/ [https://perma.cc/6X5U-63R6] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
34.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The (Un)accountable? Why critics
need to be scrutinized as much as the military, DUKE UNIV. LAWFIRE (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/12/11/the-unaccountable-why-critics-need-to-bescrutinized-as-much-as-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/P6E5-97U6] (archived Feb. 5,
2018).
35.
Mark Garlosco, How to Fix the US Military’s Broken Targeting System, JUST
SECURITY (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/49133/fix-militarys-brokentargeting-system/ [https://perma.cc/C2X2-KYUM] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
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Since at least March 2017, President Trump has given field
commanders more discretion to conduct combat operations.36 This does
not, however, seem to have triggered increased risk to civilians. For
example, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports with respect
to drone (and manned) strikes conducted in 2017 and 2018 (as of
January 19, 2018):37
Nation
Pakistan
Somalia*
Yemen*
Afghanistan*

Strikes
3
3
10
149

Max People Killed
5
35
127
2,613

Max Civilians Killed
22
240
184
1,472

*Includes manned air strikes
Given that the adversary in these countries often burrows into
civilian areas and makes widespread use of human shields, these
figures are remarkable in the relative paucity of civilian losses. In Iraq,
restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) were also revised in 2017.38 It
seems that doing so led to greater military effectiveness. Fox News
reported in December:
ISIS has been routed from Iraq and Syria with an ease and speed that's surprised
even the men and women who carried out the mission. Experts say it's a prime
example of a campaign promise kept. President Trump scrapped his
predecessor’s rules of engagement, which critics say hamstrung the military, and
let battlefield decisions be made by the generals in the theater, and not
bureaucrats in Washington.39

Importantly, however, the ROE adjustments did not change the
targeting rules in a way that would jeopardize civilians. Fox News
reported that “[Marine Brig. Gen.] Sofge said criticism that loosening
rules of engagement put civilians at risk is ‘absolutely not true.’”40 “We

36.
Max Greenwood, Trump gives commanders new powers to launch military
strikes: report, THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:19 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/
defense/322259-trump-granted-commanders-expanded-authority-to-order-militaryaction-report [https://perma.cc/M7UD-GAYJ] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
37.
Drone Warfare, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war (last visited Feb. 21, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/PS88-KDLH] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
38.
Douglas Ernst, Pentagon ditches onerous rules of engagement, gives Mosul
troops
quicker
firepower
access,
WASH.
TIMES
(Feb.
24,
2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/24/pentagon-ditches-onerous-rules-ofengagement-in-ir/ [https://perma.cc/5WQJ-D42M] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
39.
Hollie McKay, Trump, Mattis turn military loose on ISIS, leaving terror
caliphate in tatters, FOX NEWS (Dec. 10, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/
12/08/trump-mattis-turn-military-loose-on-isis-leaving-terror-caliphate-in-tatters.html
[https://perma.cc/RH4Z-428S] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
40.
Id.
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used precision strikes, and completely in accordance with international
standards,” he said.41 “We didn’t lower that standard, not one little bit.
But we were able to exercise that precision capability without
distraction and I think the results speak for themselves.”42
Plainly, combat success may require more flexibility in the
targeting process, but that does not mean that the law of war has been
abrogated. While consequentialism and kreigraison must not infect the
thinking of honorable combatants, the rapid defeat of the most
heartless and brutal of opponents is itself an action protective of
civilians.
IV. OPTIONS?
How should rule-of-law nations deal with the continuing
challenges with respect to the targeting of persons? Of course, the
starting point needs to be assuring that the actual law is properly set
forth to the public and applied correctly to a given situation. In part,
this means educating those in the media and elsewhere who really
want to be factual. In other cases, it means systematically and
consistently countering misstatements of the law and misapplications
of it. At the same time, nations must readily accept responsibility
where the facts warrant it.
Technology may also provide some help. For example, microdrones equipped with facial recognition software may be able to
conduct attacks against lawful individual targets with extreme
accuracy and minimal possibility of unintended civilian casualties.43
In addition, Western nations are taking a more liberal view of
finding military objectives that not only affect the enemy’s fielded force
in a real way but also put few civilians at risk. For example, the United
States and coalition partners battling ISIL in Iraq and Syria attacked
ISIL oil operations, which were a key source of financial support. These
attacks on “war sustaining” targets—which garnered little in the way
of objections by nation-states—constitute something of a reversal of
what many law of war academicians outside of the United States and
Israel considered permissible under international law.44
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Perhaps the most productive approach might be to attempt to
change the narrative about civilian casualties in the targeting process.
Although not often discussed, the reality is that from a military—and
moral—perspective, it cannot be overlooked that an attack that does
not take place out of a fear of civilian casualties does not mean that
fewer civilians are at risk in a particular situation. In circumstances
such as an occupation by ISIL forces, civilians are constantly at risk.45
It could be that more civilians might die when an enemy is not attacked
than would have died as a result of incidental casualties had an
otherwise lawful attack taken place.
When, for example, a ruthless enemy like ISIL is spared when an
attack is forgone because of a policy that is more limiting than what
the law of war requires with respect to incidental civilian casualties,
that enemy lives to inflict atrocities on the truly helpless. This writer
calls the phenomena the “moral hazard of inaction.”46 The DoD Law of
War Manual acknowledges this to a degree in its discussion of
“expected military advantage.” It says:
The evaluation of expected incidental harm in relation to expected military
advantage intrinsically involves both professional military judgments as well as
moral and ethical judgments evaluating the risks to human life (e.g., civilians at
risk from the attack, friendly forces or civilians at risk if the attack is not
taken).47

In other words, rather than a reactive approach to charges of
civilians causalities that tries to argue that they are few under the
circumstances, more emphasis should be put on the lives likely saved
when the target of the attack is the person or group responsible for the
vast majority of civilians losses overall in the conflict.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Rule-of-law nations in the twenty-first century face something of
a paradox with respect to targeting. As Michael Schmitt and John
Merriam explained in a 2015 article, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
goes to great lengths to comply with the law of war, and to do so under
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unique circumstances influenced by its history and culture.48 Schmitt
and Merriam say: “IDF operations are clearly well-regulated and
subject to the rule of law. The IDF has extremely robust systems of
examination and investigation of operational incidents, and there is
significant civilian oversight, both by the Attorney General and the
Supreme Court.”49
However, Schmitt and Merriam also concluded that the ability of
Israeli judge advocates to throw a “red card” (which essentially bars a
particular attack)—as well as the “concentration of investigative and
prosecutorial authority” in military lawyers—helps ensure scrupulous
adherence to the law of war. The authors find, however, that:
“[T]he system sacrifices the intangible, but very real, relationship between
Commanders and their judge advocates that results from being a member of the
Commander’s team. This relationship is, in the personal experience of the
Authors, a key factor in securing the Commander’s recognition that the law can
serve as an enabler of broader operational and strategic objectives, rather than
an obstacle to mission accomplishment.”50

Yet they also conclude that the IDF system “is arguably better
suited to the unique operational and strategic context” because the
“IDF fights enemies who intentionally employ lawfare as a tactic and
strategy” and therefore “has to be extremely cautious when conducting
a strike that might be exploited.”51
Of course, a robust role for military lawyers—not to mention a
strict adherence to the law of war—is certainly commendable. That
said, to the extent Israeli policies exceed what the law of war actually
requires, it is hard to see the tangible strategic benefits one might hope
would result. For example, there does not seem to be any objective
evidence that the vigorous process that Israel employs to protect
civilians in the targeting process employs has changed any significant
number of minds—at least on the international level—as to the
propriety of the IDF’s use of force in a given circumstance.
Accordingly, it is worth pondering whether the complex
procedures and additional restrictions not required by the
international law of war that Israel, the United States, and other ruleof-law nations utilize are really effective as counter-lawfare
techniques. To be sure, the law of war must be followed in all
particulars. There are, and always will be, tactical and even strategic
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considerations that could prudentially dictate in certain situations
restrictions, even significant restrictions, beyond those required by the
law.
However, when restrictions are imposed and openly discussed in
the hopes that such transparency will aid or even enhance the public
support—and effectively counter enemy allegations of illegalities in the
targeting persons—further consideration is warranted, particularly
where there is a dearth of evidence that the “hopes” will be achieved
by restrictive policies. What is more, these additional procedures may
crystallize in the public’s mind as required norms—a circumstance that
could be problematic in a future conflict where the stakes are truly
existential.
It may be that in fighting the most ruthless of enemies—ISIL, the
Taliban, Hezbollah, and other terrorists—faithful adherence to the law
of war in the targeting process is essential, but proliferating additional
procedures and reviews that unnecessarily impede or excessively
complicate the use of force may not benefit the civilians those processes
aim to protect.

